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When the discipline of history came to be
formalised and institutionalised in nine-
teenth-century Europe, it was assumed
that historiography was superior to, and
would displace, the many modes by which
peoples in different times and places had
re-presented their pasts to themselves.
Historiography would displace these forms
of remembering and representing the past
because it had an epistemological warrant
that they did not. The assumed epistemo-
logical superiority of historiography rested,
for the most part, on a series of oppositions
between fact and fancy, between evidence,
or hearsay and superstition, and between
objectivity and bias. The modern histori-
cal enterprise thus presumed that an ob-
ject called “history” exists, and because it
does, that it can be objectively represent-
ed, and assumed that “real” history-writing
is qualitatively different from epic, legend
and myth.
I start this article from the premise that it
is not the case that history simply “is”, and
historiography is the best way of repre-
senting the past. It is not that history sim-
ply happens, and historiography is the at-
tempt to recreate that happening through
a rigorous method. Rather, historiography
is an intellectual and cultural construct, one
particular way of construing and construct-
ing the past; at once a tradition of reason-
ing, a way of being, and a certain practice
of subjectivity. The desire to write history is
specific to certain people (societies, class-
es) and not others. It is connected to some
phenomena – the emergence of the mod-
ern state, “progress”, scientific rationality – 
and not others, which it usually defines it-
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self against (magic, gods). And I will conclude this essay by suggesting that this way of constru-
ing and representing the past is not always adequate to nonwestern pasts.
The code of history
It has often been pointed out that history is unusual in that the term for the discipline simulta-
neously designates its object. Underlying this happy coincidence – as has also been pointed out
– is an epistemological naïveté, one according to which history, unlike other disciplines, has no
need to think its object, because its object simply is. History-as-fact simply happens, and his-
tory-as-discipline is an attempt to recreate that happening to the degree that documents allow
us to do so. The result, as Louis Althusser pointed out long ago,1 is that the discipline of history
takes methodology for its theory, and historiographical debates are more often than not debates
over the “craft” of history. But this naiveté cannot obscure the fact that history as a discipline is
not so innocent of preconditions. The past is not forever available to the present, a mute entity
waiting for the historian to give it voice. History-writing is not simply a “craft” that is applied to a
preexistent, natural object, but rather, like any discipline, it conceives and constructs its object.
If history-writing constitutes its object, then how does it constitute that object? Various answers
to this can and have been given, including Lévi-Strauss’ famous answer that the code of history is
chronology,2 and the claim made by others that historiography codes/effects an absolute divide be-
tween a dead past and the present.3 Both of these are important and defining features of the code
of history, but more important still, and above all else, historiography encodes the humanism or 
anthropology that has become a defining feature of western thought from the early modern period.
It does so, first of all, inasmuch as its subject is man. This seems unremarkable – who else could
the object of history be, if not man? Tracing the semantic and epistemic changes underlying the
emergence of the concept of history, Reinhart Koselleck however notes that prior to the Enlighten-
ment “there was no history for which humanity might have been the subject”,4 but rather histories
in the plural, of specific institutions and communities. The emergence of historiography thus cor-
responds to the emergence of a “collective singular” – man – as the object of history. 
That historiography emerges as the study of the past of man also means that nature no longer 
has a history. Voltaire’s essay on “Historie” in the Encyclopédie, for example, declares that “nat-
ural history” is in fact a part of physics, not history. More generally, “historia naturalis” ceased
to belong to the domain of history.5 Gods are also expelled from the domain of history. This is
not a function of secularisation, for historiography can coexist with religion, and indeed even, as
in Ranke’s case, with the conviction that a divine providence animates history. But God or gods
can no longer be historical actors, because the subject of history is man, and only man. It is this
anthropological/humanist presumption that disqualifies many of the other forms by which peo-
ples have conceived and narrated their past – these are now declared not to be history-writing
at all, and indeed the emergent discipline defines itself against them. It also means that not only
is God not a historical actor, he is himself to be explained as a creature of men.
This last is one of the more dramatic implications of an epistemic and cultural shift which,
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among its other effects, saw the ways by which European men and women recounted their 
past replaced by this new “code”. “The task of the modern era,” wrote Ludwig Feuerbach, is “the 
humanization of God – the transformation and dissolution of theology into anthropology.”6 The 
modern era has been steadily discharging that task. Once, to understand men you had to under-
stand God; now, to understand the gods of men you have to understand the men, for their gods 
are the fantastical creation of their minds. Once, the purposes and the acts of gods explained the 
world of men; now, gods are themselves signs of men, traces from which historians, anthro-
pologists and sociologists can recreate the meanings and purposes with which these men en-
dowed their world. It is not, then, only that the subject of history is man, but that this subject is a 
Subject, that is, a meaning- and purpose-endowing being who objectifies himself in the world, 
and through whose objectifications we can recreate what sort of men these were, and what sort 
of world they had created and inhabited.
To be sure, there are important differences in how this is formulated. In some cases, the signs 
which give us information about their makers are understood as an “objective spirit”; in others, 
collectively they constitute a “culture”; in others still, these are the signs which make up the so-
cial text. In some versions, the fact that men are authors means that their productions are more 
or less transparent to them, or will become so once man produces the conditions of his life and 
his own nature under conditions of freedom; for others, we are the products of our own produc-
tions, but these operate in ways which are opaque to us and partly beyond our control and de-
termination. Different disciplines constituted on the basis of these founding presumptions also 
operationalise or mobilise them in different ways. In the case of historiography, the specific form 
in which anthropological assumptions are encoded can be clearly seen in the fetishistic concern 
with the primary source, the text or text analogue which, after Ranke, was seen to define histo-
riography as it came to be institutionalised as a discipline. Attention to primary sources is the es-
sence of historiography, not principally because this is more “rigorous” than earlier methods but 
because the idea has become naturalised that these are remnants that objectify the meanings
and purposes of historical actors, from which we can piece together the past. Thus, Marc Bloch 
wrote that “it is men that history seeks to grasp”,7 and that it achieved this through “a knowl-
edge of their tracks. Whether it is the bones immured in the Syrian fortifications, a word or form 
whose use reveals a custom, a narrative written by the witness of some scene . . . what do we 
really mean by document, if it is not a ‘track’ . . .”8 For documents to exist as such, it is precisely 
necessary that they be seen as “survivals”, as “tracks”, as “traces”. Only when we see the score of 
a Beethoven symphony as something surviving from the past that might be mined for informa-
tion about music, court culture and many other things besides – rather than as wrapping paper 
– does it become a document. That is precisely why even documents which are of dubious value 
for the direct information which they contain – forgeries are an extreme instance – are none-
theless of historical value, for they can, as traces, be made to yield other sorts of information.9
A “transcendental presupposition”
Historiography thus “encodes” anthropological presumptions with specific reference to the ob-
ject it constructs and of which it purports to offer knowledge, namely the past. Historiography is 
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by no means the only site where this epistemic and cultural transformation, one which marks
the birth of modern, western knowledge and culture, came to be effected. The transformation in
question is very much wider. One after another, modern writers of diverse philosophical affili-
ations, working from within different disciplines – Vico, Herder, Tylor, Cassirer, Geertz, Dilthey,
Greenblatt and the “New Historicism”, and numerous others – testify that behind most things
lurks man; that art and literature, religion and morality and myth, law and custom, and common
sense are all “products”, “expressions” or “traces” of “societies” or “peoples” or “cultures”. I have
designated this shift, in shorthand form, as anthropology/humanism. As observed, what pre-
cise form these presumptions take varies across authors and also according to discipline. The
differences are important, but underlying them is a more basic commonality, a shared episte-
mological space. Max Weber characterised it thus: “The transcendental presupposition of every
cultural science . . . is that we are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take
a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.”10
I cite Weber not only because “transcendental presupposition” is a particularly apt formulation
but also because Weber recognises that the adoption of this presupposition marks a cultural
and epistemic transformation, a shift from seeing the world as a text, imbued with meaning and
purpose, of which men, as creatures made in God’s image and endowed with grace and reason,
are privileged readers, to the view of the world as a social text of which men are the authors.
In Weber’s account this presupposition arises with the “disenchantment of the world”, where
modern men and women in the Occident recognise that they are cultural beings who endow the
world with significance precisely because, and in proportion to, the fact that they are forced to
recognise that there are no meanings already in the world waiting to be “discovered”: “The fate
of an epoch which has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn
the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be
in a position to create this meaning itself.”11 This has not always been presumed, and thus this
disenchanted outlook has a history, consisting in the specific form that rationalisation took in
Occidental religions, culminating in Protestantism and the social and scientific developments
with which it was associated.
But if the realisation that we endow meaning on the world has a history: in what sense is this a
transcendental presupposition? That is, if it is borne of the specific history of the modern West,
how can it be said to be a presupposition of universal import? For example, if in the past men
and women in Europe saw God as the source of reality and of meaning, whereas we disenchant-
ed moderns do not, then by what warrant do we privilege our presupposition, and conclude that
their God has to be understood and explained as meanings they endowed their world with, rath-
er than that which gave them life and the world meaning? And by what right do we do so for the
nonwestern world, which may not have undergone the same processes of rationalisation, cul-
minating in the disenchantment of the world?
The answer, according to Weber, is that while we moderns have come to the realisation that the
world is disenchanted as a consequence of a very specific (Occidental) history, humans have al-
ways been the producers of meanings and purposes, even when they have not realised it. David
Kolb writes, “In Weber’s eyes, modernity is an explicit recognition of what the self and society
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have been all along. Modern identity is not just another in a sequence of historic constructions; 
it is the unveiling of what has been at the root of these constructions.”12 From this perspective, it
is enchantment, as intellectual “error”, that needs “explaining”; the disenchantment of the world, 
while it has a history, is the truth finally uncovered. As with other moderns, Weber sees moderni-
ty as a privileged vantage point that finally makes comprehensible all the history that preceded it.
Weber’s analysis of disenchantment is deeply indebted to Nietzsche. When Nietzsche has a 
madman announce the death of God, and when he announces the advent of nihilism and the 
destruction of values, he too is announcing that belief in a transcendent realm of values, in God, 
in Platonism, is nearing its end. At times he sounds like an upbeat Weber, one who welcomes
and celebrates this development, because it allows man to recognise as his that which he once 
attributed to others:
All the beauty and sublimity we have bestowed upon real and imaginary things, I will re-
claim as the property and product of man; as his fairest apology. Man as poet, as thinker, 
as God, as love, as power; O, with what regal liberality he has lavished gifts on things,
only to impoverish himself and make himself feel wretched! His most unselfish act hith-
erto was to admire and worship and to know how to conceal from himself that it was he
who created all that he admired.13
The transcendent values to which men have subordinated themselves have in fact always been 
their own products; every discovery was in fact an invention, every interpretation a new crea-
tion. Nietzsche thinks a recognition of this fact affords the possibility of a freedom to revalue all 
values, recognising them all as human creations. But there is an important difference between 
Nietzsche and Weber, and it does not simply lie in the fact that Nietzsche views with gaiety and 
lightness what Weber announces with foreboding. The Genealogy of Morals and other writings 
provide also a genealogy of the subject, not as a natural being whose essence is to be possessed 
of consciousness and the capacity to create meaning but as someone created to be able to make 
promises, to feel guilt, to subscribe to values, and the like. Thus for Nietzsche – albeit inconsist-
ently so – the subject is not the source and origin of meaning and value, but is himself a histori-
cal product, forged on the anvil of Christian morality and Roman law. Weber assumes that the 
value-creating or culture-secreting individual has always existed, but only becomes aware of 
himself as such in modern times, whereas for Nietzsche this individual is himself a creation or 
invention. The difference is significant, because if the presumption that humans are the source
of all values and meanings is in fact historically and culturally produced, then we may not be en-
titled to presuppose it where such a subject has not been created.
This is Heidegger’s position. Heidegger rejects all talk of Weltanschauung and of different ways
of “picturing” the world, precisely because this assumes that men have always pictured the 
world and ascribed value to it. The difference between the medieval and modern worlds is not, 
however, that modern men and women picture the world differently and have different values.
To see the world as a picture, to have values and cultures and experiences, are not transcen-
dental presuppositions which have finally come into their own but are rather a consequence of 
cultural and epistemic shifts, including the rise of a metaphysics of subjectivity that Heidegger 
labels “anthropology”:
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That the world becomes picture is one and the same event with the event of man’s be-
coming subiectum . . . the more extensively and the more effectively the world stands at 
man’s disposal as conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more 
subjectively . . . does the subiectum rise up, and all the more impetuously, too, do obser-
vation and teaching about the world change into a doctrine of man, into anthropology. It 
is no wonder that humanism first arises where the world becomes picture . . . Human-
ism, therefore, in the more strict historiographical sense, is nothing but a moral aesthetic
anthropology. The name “anthropology” as used here . . . designates that philosophical 
interpretation of man which explains and evaluates whatever is, in its entirety, from the 
standpoint of man and in relation to man.14
The contemporary antihumanists who are the heirs of Nietzsche and Heidegger similarly insist 
that man, far from always having been a value-creating and meaning-producing being who, 
with modernity, finally becomes aware of that fact, is himself a historically produced, and pos-
sibly transient, consequence of contingent historical events. One effect of such analyses is that
historiography is immediately rendered problematic: if man is a product of history, he cannot be 
the constant whose changes and transformations it retells. Indeed, analyses of this sort reverse 
our normal sequence of cause and effect, suggesting that it is not because man is the origin and 
source of meaning and values that he is the subject of anthropology and history, but rather that 
it is this presupposition and its correlates, embedded in our culture and our thought, that serve 
to create and secure humanism and anthropology. Historiography is one of the important means
by which, and sites on which, this is achieved. “Making historical analysis the discourse of the 
continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development
and all action,” according to Michel Foucault, “are two sides of the same system of thought,” one 
characterised by “the sovereignty of the subject and the twin figures of anthropology and human-
ism”.15 Indeed, history-writing has an especially important function to fulfil, for as this humanism 
and anthropology have come to be assailed in the study of language, myth, sexuality and kinship,
historiography becomes “the last resting-place of anthropological thought”,16 or in Lévi-Strauss’
words, “the last refuge of a transcendental humanism”.17
Hermeneutics, historiography and nonwestern pasts
If Weber’s transcendental presupposition cannot in fact be presupposed, if it confuses cause with 
effect, then this constitutes a problem for the code of history whenever it is applied to an object
where the anthropological presumptions of the code are absent. Michel de Certeau points out 
that when historians study religion, they take it as their task to ask what religion tells us about
the society from which it sprang. They assume, that is, that “society” is the axis of reference that 
will render religious phenomena intelligible, whereas for their subjects religion was (often) what
made society intelligible:
The religious history of the seventeenth century . . . implicates a difference between two 
systems of representation, one “social” (so to speak) and the other “religious”; that is,
between two periods of consciousness, or between two historical types of intelligibility, 
our and theirs. Thus, we have to wonder what may be the meaning of an enterprise that 
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consists of “understanding” a time organized as a function of a standard of comprehen-
sion other than ours. [For in this, our,] perspective, “comprehending” religious phenom-
ena is tantamount to repeatedly asking something else of them than what they meant to 
say . . . taking as a representation of the society what, from their point of view, founded
that society . . .18
The study of a past that is significantly “other” is in this case characterised by a reversal which 
Certeau renders through a metaphor drawn from chess: “Between their time and ours, the sig-
nifier and the signified have castled. We postulate a coding which inverts that of the time we are 
studying.”19 As a modern, rational practice, historiography cannot accord God the role of a histori-
cal actor, and thus we translate seventeenth-century understandings into our terms. Far from 
being defined by its avoidance of “anachronism”, history-writing as discipline and practice is in 
fact based on anachronism, continually translating the understandings of historical subjects into 
our modern, anthropological understanding. But the converse is also true; our historical practice 
is not an ex nihilo creation, but arises out of previous debates – “when they refer to their own 
practices . . . historians discover constraints originating well before their own present, dating 
back to former organisations of which their work is a symptom, not a cause.”20 “Our” historical 
discourse is a product of those debates and processes which, beginning four centuries and more 
ago, rendered religion into a phenomenon susceptible to sociological explanation, rather than 
regarding the human world as one to be understood in terms of divine instigation.
Just as the “model” of religious sociology implies, among other things, the new status of 
practice or of knowledge in the seventeenth century, so do current methods – erased as 
events and transformed into codes or problematic areas of research – bear evidence of 
former structurings and forgotten histories. Thus founded on the rupture between a past 
that is its object, and a present that is the place of its practice, history endlessly finds the 
present in its object and the past in its practice.21
Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued that all encounters with past texts and text-analogues are 
intrinsically interpretive, and that all interpretation in the human sciences is intrinsically histori-
cal. All encounters with the past occur within a tradition, and if history-writing is practiced in a 
hermeneutical rather than positivist and objectifying way, it can lead to greater self-conscious-
ness of that tradition. If we translate Certeau’s observations into Gadamerian terms – recog-
nising that to do so is not to stay with Certeau’s thought – we could say the following: When 
we encounter a text from, say, seventeenth-century Europe, one which explains society and its 
functioning in terms of God, the distance between the text and our historical situation cannot be 
bridged by cancelling one of the terms. Understanding is achieved neither by imposing our cur-
rent understandings on the text (for example, by treating God as a “projection” and/or as ideol-
ogy), nor can we seek, as romantic hermeneutics would, to recreate the context and meaning of 
that text in order to restore it to its original meaning and intention. An acknowledgement of the 
historicity of our own understanding means that we cannot accord our categories of interpreta-
tion any privilege; but the same acknowledgement of the historicity of our understanding means 
there is no way of encountering the text “in its own right”. Because this is something more than 
an epistemological dilemma, it is capable of “resolution”. The text is not just an object of the past 
belonging purely to the present, for it comes to us already interpreted, not as a mere object, but 
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as a tissue of interpretations. We must remain open to its “truth”, and if we become convinced 
of this, it forces us to rethink our current understandings, and to redescribe the tradition through 
which it arrives to us. However if, as is more likely in this case, we find ourselves unable to reach
an agreement with the text – if there can be no fusion of horizons – we are then entitled to try 
and situate it in terms of its context. But even here, the end point is not the same as it would be 
had we dismissed the truth of the text from the beginning, for we have reencountered and have 
arrived at a better understanding of our relation to a tradition in which God once bestrode the 
world and made it in his image, but which later gave way to a “secular” view in which God had his 
historical agency withdrawn from him. The “former structurings and forgotten histories” which 
have brought us to our present historical situation are no longer “forgotten”; they have been dis-
interred and reexamined, and we have arrived at a better understanding of the tradition through 
which we speak as a result of this encounter. History “finds the present in its object and the past
in its practice” self-consciously, as a result of such a dialogic encounter, even where, as in this 
instance, we cannot acknowledge the truth of the text nor achieve a fusion of horizons.
❖
I am enquiring into what it means, using the code of history, to write about those who do not live 
by that code or recognise themselves in it. I have argued that this question arises not only with 
reference to the nonwestern world but also with reference to premodern Europe. To explain the 
world of men and women of medieval times historically is to translate their understandings into 
our terms, or to repeat Certeau’s words, is to “postulate a coding which inverts that of the time
we are studying”. However this exercise, while anachronistic, is nonetheless productive; even
where we cannot accept the “truth” of texts from the past, we gain better self-understanding,
that is, understanding of the tradition out of which we reason.
The same is not true when we apply the code of history to nonwestern pasts, for the simple rea-
son that the object of enquiry does not belong to the same tradition as the enquiring subject.22 To
write a history of, say, India from within western knowledge is to confront the fact that the “now” 
from which we write is not itself linked in a thousand ways to the “then” of those of whom we 
write, because a profound caesura separates the two; the tradition from which we write is not 
the same as that of which we write. Thus, what might serve to validate the anachronism which 
is an inescapable feature of historiography even when it encounters European pasts is not true 
here, because, in this case, history “finds the present in its object”, but it does not find an Indian
“past in its practice”.
The knowledge from which we write a history of India is not continuous with the knowledges 
and intellectual traditions of India. These intellectual traditions had not died of inanition when the 
British first came to India; as late as the seventeenth century there was an explosion of scholarly
writing in Sanskrit, testifying to the vitality of an extraordinarily long and continuous intellectual
tradition. Some of the navya or new scholars of that time self-consciously saw themselves as 
effecting innovations; but they were still heirs to a tradition going back two millennia, which they 
actively engaged, disputed with and developed. The same in not true of historiography, for nei-
ther the Sanskrit tradition(s), nor any other indigenous tradition, found an echo in the code of his-
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tory by which we write of Indian pasts. This code was an imposition; it did not engage with Indian 
traditions, did not refute them and thereby displace them. Its victory was won cheaply, through
administrative fiat, when in 1835 India’s British rulers decided that only that education which
sought to disseminate modern, western knowledge through modern institutions and pedagogic
processes was to receive government patronage; and that the teaching of modern history was 
to replace the indigenous Puranic “histories” which Thomas Babington Macaulay characterised
and dismissed as “abounding with kings thirty feet high and reigns thirty thousand years long, 
and geography made of seas of treacle and seas of butter”.23
As a result, the code of history cannot even fulfil the hermeneutic function that it fills elsewhere, 
that of being one of the modes by which men and women of the West can, through the self-con-
sciously anachronistic exercise of translating the lives and worlds of their dead forebears into 
their own terms, illuminate both what connects and separates them from this past and these 
forebears. In India that role continued to be performed by the genealogist, the balladeer, and the 
storyteller, who interpreted and refurbished the tradition to which they belonged by retelling the 
past.24 The historian, however, was closer to the position of the colonial official (many of whom, 
like James Mill and Macaulay, were also historians); she was discontinuous with, and in a posi-
tion of pure externality to, the pasts of which she wrote.
Conclusion
In this article I have suggested that anthropology/humanism has fostered an illusion, mistak-
ing effect for cause; that it is not because there is man that the sciences of man have arisen, but 
that it is the latter that encode, and thus serve to produce and secure, humanism. In characteris-
ing modern thought as anthropological, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and other writers I have 
drawn on to develop my argument also offer a critique of this anthropological presumption. For 
instance, they argue that the subject is neither sovereign nor transparent to himself; that just
as he is an effect of certain events, he may one day disappear. I am sympathetic to these argu-
ments, but here I have invoked them for their characterisation, rather than for their critique. I 
suggest that the assumption that man is a creator of meanings and values is not a “transcen-
dental presupposition” we are entitled and even obliged to make, but is rather a form of “tran-
scendental narcissism”,25 one of the means by which the modern West creates and secures the 
anthropological/humanist theme that man is the source and origin of meaning and value – and 
hence the subject of history. Nonetheless, inasmuch as this humanism is in fact secured, inas-
much as the West is dominated by a metaphysics of subjectivity, inasmuch as the presupposi-
tion that man is the source and origin of meaning, value and purpose is found in a wide range 
of practices and institutions and intellectual activities, then a historiography founded on similar 
premises is an appropriate way for such societies to conceive of their past and represent it to
themselves.
Whether such premises are also valid for writing histories of nonwestern cultures will depend on 
whether such presuppositions found a home there. That is, it will depend on whether the “tran-
scendental narcissism” of the West succeeded in also becoming a narcissism in the East; wheth-
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er this “white mythology”, as Derrida terms it,26 also became part of the mythos of the nonwhite 
world.27 Since this has only partially occurred, post-Enlightenment historiography may not be 
adequate for the task of representing Indian pasts. I suggest then that the code of history is but 
one way of representing the past, and a recent one. It is eminently useful even where anachro-
nistic, for when written in a hermeneutic mode, it can be a way of engaging, better understand-
ing, and developing and refurbishing the intellectual tradition(s) to which we belong, and out of
which we reason. But this is only true where the code of history is applied to the pasts out of
which this code itself developed; applied to other pasts, it is neither the “right” way of recounting 
these pasts, nor does it illuminate the traditions of the peoples whose pasts these are.
Traditions are not hermetically sealed of course. The civilisation of medieval and early modern India 
was itself a palimpsest, born of the meeting of the culture, knowledges and institutions to which the 
subcontinent had been home, and those the Turk and Afghan and Persian invaders brought with 
them. If we are willing to allow for the existence of a “western tradition” stretching back to a time 
long before there was any conception of “Europe” or the West, this was a tradition that includes the 
collapse of Rome and the fusion of Roman law with barbarian institutions, the later revival of Greek 
learning, and the synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christianity effected by St Thomas. Moreover, 
this and the traditions of India never developed in complete isolation from each other; and for some 
four hundred years now the ways of the western barbarians have been finding a home in India. 
A fusion of traditions may yet occur, and out of this a new tradition may yet be founded. However, 
historiography today cannot assume that this has already occurred. For now, to write history in a 
western mode with even a modicum of self-consciousness is to be continually reminded not only 
that one is writing from a historical now which is very different from that of the object of study, but 
also that this difference is not the space of a dialogue where we simultaneously refurbish and re-
consider the tradition within which we are located, but that it marks a profound break, the full im-
plications of which historiography has yet to register, let alone begin to seriously consider.
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